This month’s Foreign Policy, among other things, features a back page contributed by editor-in-chief Moises Naim. He posits what should be a salient observation of our times - economics, as a discipline, has failed us miserably and is in dire need of an intellectual bailout.
Naim’s thesis rests on the fact that economics failed to predict and correct for the predicament that is the global financial disruption we’ve been coping with. Any model, for it to be successful most both explain and predict - most economists wouldn’t argue that economics is poor at predicting.
Examination, however, will reveal that it is also poor at explaining. What Naim is getting at, but perhaps can’t get to within the scope of his publication, is our conventional notions of rationality and sagacity are fundamentally erroneous. Any discipline that rests upon them is equally flawed. Economics isn’t unique in its use of instrumental rationality, it’s unique in the degree to which it relies on this ontological assumption.
I think it uncontroversial to suggest conventional notions of international relations, economics and much of decision theory has its roots in Hume. Adam Smith justified instrumental rationality - giving it a moral teleology through “enlightened self-interest.”
The unsettling problem about Hume and Smith, and von Neumann and others, is that their neat worlds of utils and maximization curves; the calculus with which they explain social (or at least economic) reality simply doesn’t exist. It simply cannot be a possible (or even normatively desirable) way of explaining how people act, even in ideal circumstances.
Smith and Hume have contrived formal systems - that is, they make the problem of choice computable in the formal sense of token manipulation. One simply seeks a maximum payoff given an algorithmic imperative (profit maximization, loss aversion, etc.)
I expect you to take me at my word that has proven, thus far, impossible to use formal systems to explain human behaviour - yet economists run on the assumption that one can. Not only do they run on the assumption that it’s possible, they believe they have contrived such a formal system.
So, most of the social sciences premise their theory on a particular definition of rationality. A definition, which if explored (even by a college undergrad) becomes untenable and worse than useless.
Pragmatic economists argue that while irrationality, that is deviation from the precepts of instrumental rationality, exists within the decisions of an individual, it is unsystematic. That means that in aggregate (such as in the market) irrationality is in effect random “noise” that doesn’t disrupt the models developed by economists.
One doesn’t need to be a social scientist to find this argument unconvincing - turn on the news and one can see that irrationality is more systematic than could be tolerated by the above explanation.
Kant saw this coming - he expressed profound dissatisfaction with utilitarian instrumental rationality because it would simply be a collection of theoretical imperatives. Daniel Dennet should find it equally troubling, because instrumental rationality would result in a total erosion of moral choice due to combinatorial explosion - a situation of even moderate complexity or novelty would paralyze even the most specifically principled agent.
Instrumental rationality not only doesn’t exist - it cannot possibly exist. If one were a rational agent in the instrumental sense, arising from a chair or drinking a glass of milk would be paralyzing events of decision, optimization and action.
Smith and others recognized this crippling problem of economics by simply isolating the system - factors outside the model were either deemed irrelevant or held constant. Where could anyone get it in their head that your family’s religion didn’t affect your economic framing? This is a procedural change - not some shift in quantitative utility, the very logic applied shifts - the kind, quantity and degree of bias one shows is affected.
How is it possible anyone could be regarded a competent expert in optimal decision-making while simultaneously stating baldly that psychological factors are irrelevant?
Naim was right to suggest that economics is in need of an intellectual bail-out. However, just like the financial melt-down caused the excision of poor performers and bad-actors, so too must economics (and adjunct disciplines) toss out bad ontology. It will be painful and violently disruptive to the discipline - but economics must box-in the traditional assumptions about rationality.
In light of Einstein, physicists had to revise much of their understanding. Newton wasn’t locked out but his inclusion was qualified. Newtonian physics (which uses the same syntactical tools as economics, that is calculus) is still used and taught - despite being heavily disrupted. Economics must perform a similar renovation.
Elsewise it will go the way of Ptolemaic astronomy or the aether theories of physics.
Uncategorized | No Comments »